requirement when delinquencies are on the rise and new farmers typically have less assets to offer as collateral. Moreover, even when lenders make lending decisions based on not on collateral but on projected performance, younger farmers are still at a disadvantage because they have lower return on assets compared to more established operations (Mishra et al., 2009) .
Even prior to the financial crisis, farmers in Alabama, especially small sole proprietors, were financially constrained and used off farm spousal income to invest on the farm (Hartarska and Mai, 2008) . In this paper, we use survey data collected in the fall of 2010 from new operations in Alabama to study the degree to which new operations were financially constrained during the post crisis period and to identify the factors affecting lending in the 2009-2010 period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and empirical specifications. Section 3 briefly describes the data. Section 4 summarizes the results. Conclusions are offered in Section 5.
Analytical framework and empirical specifications
The analysis consists of first establishing if new operators have financing (or liquidity) constraints and whether these constraints have become more severe in the post crisis period.
Next, we identify the factors affecting farmers' ability to obtain credit, in order to gain insights into possible ways to alleviate existing financing constraints.
The first part of the analysis is based on the literature on asymmetric information in credit markets. According to this literature, in the presence of high transaction costs and asymmetric information, loans are either rationed or available at a premium (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . In such circumstances, external and internal finance are no longer substitutes and investment in firms facing high information costs, such as most new farming operators, is constrained by the availability of internal funds (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Since financial constraints do not affect all farmers uniformly, the extent of effective financing constraints that different operators face provides information on the ability of the financial system to cater to their financial needs in that time period.
Financial constraints are important in farming because farming is capital intensive and while farmers do not like debt, many especially newer operations, have limited ability to undertake profitable investment with only own funds. The lack of equity markets and seasonality of cash flows makes access to loans crucial and the ability of credit markets to alleviate financing constraints very important. Moreover, limited diversification opportunity and supply shocks lead to large variations in farmers' net worth and profitability further restricting their investment.
The financing constraints approach, pioneered by Fazzari et al. (1988) , tests for differences in sensitivity of investment to internal funds in firms with different levels of informational opacity by comparing sub-samples, defined according to priors that characterize constrained and unconstrained firms (e.g., new and established farms). For each sub-sample, a reduced-form investment equation is estimated where investment is modeled as a function of internal funds and investment opportunities determined from a variety of theoretical perspectives (Hubbard, 1998) . i A statistically significant difference in investment sensitivity to internal funds between sub-samples indicates that one group is more credit constrained. Recently, Carreira and Silva (2010) provided an extensive review of the vast empirical literature on the subject. In particular, they argue that numerous studies find that younger firms are more financially constrained than established firms. and newest (since 2005) and test for the difference in sensitivity of investment to cash flows. In this framework, we also test for differences in financing constraints before and after the crisis of 2008 for each group. Following Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008) , investment is modeled as a function of operators' investment opportunity and internally generated funds (typically defined as revenues minus expenses) to which we add change in liquidity since 2008 and controls.
ii The estimated model is of the form: farmers cannot obtain a loan to invest in fixed assets, they can lease it, and there will be no change in investment but we argue that even if this is true it will be systematic (y measurement error), and remaining investment cash flow sensitivity remains informative. We also note that the majority of farm operators in Alabama are in livestock production (cow and calf) or poultry (66 % of all farm sales), and land is less important capital asset compared to land in raw-crop producing regions. To attenuate this problem, we add the value of farm assets at the beginning of the operation, the type of farm operation, and the average county per acre price of land. During the study period, there were no recorded drops in the price of agricultural land values, so possible bias is likely one-sided. Since the possible measurement error is in the left hand side variable, it will be swept away in the error term.
Since we find that the newest operations face financing constrains, we next want to know which farmers were able to overcome these constraints and secure loans. To answer this question, we estimate a probit model of who got credit and who was rejected. Some operators, however, may have self-selected out of the market because they believed they would not be approved even if they applied for credit. Thus, we estimate a Heckman type probit model to control for farmers' self-selection following Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981) . Specifically, the unobserved relationship is
where y j * is the credit received by operators and x includes variables affecting banks' decisions to lend. However, instead of y * j , we only observe a binary outcome (received or did not receive loans) which is captured by a probit equation
However, the dependent variable for operator j is observed only if we observe a loan application from that operator. Thus, the selection equation (applying not applying for a loan) is where S is the set of observations for which y j is observed, Φ . is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function (with mean [ 0 0 ]`0), Φ . is the standard cumulative normal, and w j is an optional weight for observation j.
v To achieve identification, we need at least one instrument in z j that does not also belong to x, otherwise identification can be achieved only by functional form. The instrument needs to affect the choice to apply or not to apply for credit but not lenders' decisions to lend. We use two instruments: z 1, the perceived lack of access to credit from banks and financial institutions, and z 2 , the perceived lack of access to credit from the Farm Credit System.
The explanatory variables in the second stage include factors affecting the decision to extend a loan by a lender. This decision is based on evaluation of project profitability, collateral, and borrower credit worthiness. Since agricultural lending remains collateral driven, the existence and value of collateral will be the main determinant on who gets a credit or not.
Lenders do not have perfect knowledge of the project's quality and the borrower's credibility. To decrease information asymmetry, lenders collect additional information about borrowers and their projects and require collateral to guard against default. Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger, (2008) show that asymmetric information can result not only in typical quantity rationing but also in "risk rationing" whereby farmers are able to borrow but only under highcollateral contracts which bring then lower expected well-being. Therefore, farmers' perception of the collateral requirement will affect their application decision. We asked operators if they considered availability of collateral as an obstacle to obtaining loans and use this variable in the credit equation.
To control for possible land price effects, we include county level land values. We also include farm age to control for availability and quality of financial statements and a growth dummy to proxy for farm profitability, since agricultural lenders are increasingly using cash flow rather than collateral based lending (Klinefelter and Penson, 2005) . We also control for operators' income diversification and creditworthiness by including the percentage of income coming from farming and whether the operator works off the farm since banks also use such information in lending decisions (Berger and Udell, 1998) .
To properly identify the effect of credit constraints on investment, variables that affect credit but not investment should be included in the credit offer equation. This variable takes the value of one if the enterprise grew (experienced employment growth) and zero otherwise. The assumption is that change in ROA used in the investment equation captures (expected in previous period) investment opportunities, while the dummy variable used in the credit offer equation provides information only on whether growing firms were funded or not.
The data
The data come from a survey of new farmers in Alabama, conducted by Alabama National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) in October 2010. The survey was designed to collect unique financial, business and demographic information from new operators in the state. Since land is part of fixed investment, there is a concern that measured increases in investment may be due to change in land prices even if there was no real investment change. The cash flow variable is measured by the percentage of profits (revenue minus costs) kept in liquid assets. Table 1 shows only few statistically significant differences between the two groups. We asked whether the liquidity farmers kept has increased after the crisis and use this dummy to explore if there is a possible effect on investment. We do not find statistically significant difference across the two groups with only 22 percent in each group reporting they kept high levels of liquidity after the crisis.
Opportunity cost of capital is measured by two dummy variables -one that takes the value of one if operations' ROA has increased in the 2008-2010 period and zero otherwise, and one dummy that takes the value of one if ROA has decreased during the period and zero otherwise. The base dummy variable is the one with no change in ROA.
ix Table 1 shows that increase in ROA was twice higher (10 %) among the newest operators than among the new operations (5 %) and this difference is statistically significant, although at the 10 % level.
Among the control variables, we find few statistically significant differences across the groups. The newest farmers have fewer years of previous experience in farming (8.5 versus13.5) and higher proportion of their income coming from farming (17% versus 9%). Compared to the group of new operators, larger proportion of operators from the newest group have a Masters Degree or higher (16% versus 9%), fewer have sales from livestock production (51% versus 62%) and fewer are black (7% versus 13%). Fewer of the newest operators inherited it (14 % versus 24% ) and more purchased it (19% versus 12%). Most interestingly, while only 5% of the sample of operators in the new group had beginning assets of $250,000 or more, 29 % of the newest operations fall within this group. It is possible that many of the newest entrants in farming bought land to diversify their assets in unstable financial markets. However, since much higher percentage of this group's income comes from farming, it is possible that the high returns to farming in the past few years had attracted new entrants.
Summary statistics for the variables in the credit offer equation are also presented in Table 1 . There is a statistically significant difference between credit applications by the new and by the newest farmers (25% vs. 38%, respectively).
x To evaluate how collateral requirements affected access to loans, we asked farmers if collateral requirements were an obstacle to obtaining loans. The answer choices were "no obstacle" which we use as a base, while the obstacles were classified as minor, moderate, and major. We find statistically significant difference between the two groups only in the moderate category: 27% vs. 17% for the newest and the new farmers, respectively. Table 2 presents the results from the regression of investment sensitivity to cash flow and investment opportunity. It contains 3 models with three different samples, the first with operators who started any part of their operations after 2005 (the newest group), the second with those who started between 2000 and 2005(new) , and the last regression uses all observations. The overall fit of these models is acceptable explaining from a quarter to a third of the variation in the data.
Results and Discussion

Liquidity constrains
The results indicate that, as expected, investment opportunity affects investment by new farming operations in all specifications. Compared to farmers with a flat ROA, investment in operations with increasing ROA is higher by 12 percent and that in operations with decreasing ROA is lower by 6 percent. These results are the same for both groups of farmers.
We find that investment in the group of newest operators depends on internal cash flows Few other variables are statistically significant in the OLS model. In the group of newest operations, female operators had 7 % less investment than male operators. This result, combined with the relatively high age of operators and anecdotal evidence suggests that the sample contains widows receiving an inheritance and disinvesting from farming. In the same subsample, operators in poultry have higher investment compared to operators in livestock with one percent higher income from poultry associated with 8 % higher investment. Off farm work by the operator or the spouse and the percentage of income from farming are not associated with higher level of investment. We also do not find that experience in farming or in other business, operator age, education level, or race are associated with differences in on-farm investment, contrary to findings for off-farm investment by farmers (Mishra et al., 2001 ).
Since land and its acquisition is important in farming, and we do not have data on operators' land ownership, to ameliorate possible measurement issues in the change in the investment variable, we include the level of farm assets at the begging of the operation and county level land prices for 2007. We find that 100 dollars higher land values are associated with about 3.8 percent disinvestment in farming and this variable is statistically significant only in the first specification for the newest operations. These results may suggest that relatively expensive land promotes leasing, or that it forces disinvestment in other capital assets.
In terms of the size of the beginning assets, we find differences in association with investment only for the first model specifications and it indicates that farmers with larger beginning assets were much more likely to disinvest from farming compared to those in the smallest $5,000 or less beginning assets class 1 .
Access to credit
Since financing constraints in new operators exist as our results suggest, we turn to the credit The results suggest that, for the overall sample of new farmers, those who thought they would not be awarded credit were 20 % less likely to apply than farmers who though that they could get credit from banks and other financial institutions. The newest operators were even less likely to apply as shown by the higher marginal impact coefficient of 27. Results further suggest that lending to farmers remains collateral driven. Farmers who thought collateral was a minor obstacle were 18 % less likely to apply (14 for the newest group) and those who thought collateral is a major obstacle were 27% (or 18 % for the newest group) less likely to apply for loans. The group of the newest farmers seems less likely to apply if they feel they do not have access to loans from FCS or commercial banks but, compared to all farmers, are less averse to applying if collateral is a problem. Together, these results support the idea that new farmers and their lenders are less interested in the return to assets where collateral plays major role consistent and perhaps more interested in the return to management, consistent with the literature.
We further find that average land prices do not affect the probability of loan application.
Farmers running new operations were more likely to apply for loan. One additional year in business is associated with 0.6% and 6% lower probability of applying for credit for the new and newest operations, respectively.
The results from the impact of income diversification show that one percent increase in income from farming is associated with 0.5 % increase in probability of applying for a loan.
Farmers with off farm jobs were 13.7 % more likely to apply for loans than farmers who did not work off the farm suggesting that income diversification might have affected farmers' confidence to seek loans. We further find that a 10 point increase in income from livestock production is associated with one percent higher probability to apply for loans and one percent higher probability of being denied a loan. The latter is a small magnitude but it is consistent with the resent problems in the market for protein production (Elinger, 2011).
After controlling for the self-selection out of the credit market, we find that operators who considered collateral a moderate obstacle to getting credit were 6% more likely to have been denied loans while this coefficient is almost doubled to 11% for the group of newest operations.
Compared to operators who did not consider collateral a problem, those who considered it a major problem were 16.3 % more likely to be denied credit, and this coefficient is 20.5% in the group of the newest operations.
The dummy for growth is statistically significant and loan applicants whose operations grew were 10 to 15% more likely to have been approved for loans compared to those who did not experience growth, suggesting that agricultural lenders consider factors other than collateral.
This finding may give support to the idea that lenders are increasingly focusing on cash flow rather than collateral based lending (Klinefelter and Penson, 2005) .
Conclusions
In this paper, we set out to establish how the financial crisis on 2008 has affected farmers' credit constraints and who were the farmers able to secure loans for their operation. We focus on the most vulnerable farmers -those with new operation or any part of their operating started in the past 10 years. Survey data from over 300 farmers from Alabama are used to estimate investment equation linking investment to investment opportunity and cash flow. Significant cash flow variable is interpreted as an indicator that internal and external funds are not perfect substitutes and evidence of credit (liquidity) constraints since investment depends on internally generated funds.
In this context, we test for a link between investment and farmers keeping larger liquidity post 2008 as evidence of worsened credit constraints but we do not find evidence that the crisis has worsened the credit constraints of new operations in Alabama. We further find financing constraints only for the group of operators who started any part of their operating since 2005 with 10% increase in cash flow associated with about 1% increase in investment. We did not find financing constraints for the group of operations that started/expanded between 2000 and 2004, consistent with previous findings about agricultural producers in Kansas (Bierlen and Featherstone 1998) .
Exploring what factors affected agricultural lenders decisions to fund or not agricultural producers, we found that collateral remains the main obstacle to obtaining loans. We also found that farmers' cash flow and profitability were also considered and were more important to the newest operations. Since our survey results also show that most new farmers use multiple sources to start and expand their operations, programs to encourage entrepreneurship remain relevant. 
